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criterion in consent waivers for health data
and tissue research
G. Owen Schaefer1, Graeme Laurie2, Sumytra Menon1, Alastair V. Campbell1 and Teck Chuan Voo1*Abstract
Background: Several jurisdictions, including Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and most recently Ireland, have a
public interest or public good criterion for granting waivers of consent in biomedical research using secondary
health data or tissue. However, the concept of the public interest is not well defined in this context, which creates
difficulties for institutions, institutional review boards (IRBs) and regulators trying to implement the criterion.
Main text: This paper clarifies how the public interest criterion can be defensibly deployed. We first explain the
ethical basis for requiring waivers to only be granted to studies meeting the public interest criterion, then explore
how further criteria may be set to determine the extent to which a given study can legitimately claim to be in the
public interest. We propose an approach that does not attempt to measure magnitude of benefit directly, but
rather takes into account metrics that are more straightforward to apply. To ensure consistent and justifiable
interpretation, research institutions and IRBs should also incorporate procedural features such as transparency and
public engagement in determining which studies satisfy the public interest requirement.
Conclusion: The requirement of public interest for consent waivers in secondary biomedical research should be
guided by well-defined criteria for systematic evaluation. Such a criteria and its application need to be periodically
subject to intra-committee and intra-institution review, reflection, deliberation and amendment.
Keywords: Public interest, Public good, Consent waivers, Ethics review, Research ethicsBackground
There is a small but growing number of jurisdictions
that have a public interest or equivalent criterion – pub-
lic good or public benefit – for granting consent waivers
for secondary biomedical research involving personal
data1 and/or human tissue. For example, New Zealand© The Author(s). 2020 Open Access This artic
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Full list of author information is available at the end of the articleguidelines on waivers require that “public benefit out-
weighs public interest in privacy” [1], while Australian
guidelines requires that the public interest in the re-
search substantially outweighs the public interest in priv-
acy [2]. In 2015, Singapore enacted a law requiring,
among other things, that consent waivers only be
granted for “human biomedical research or health infor-
mation research [that] would reasonably be considered
to contribute to the greater public good” [3]. And in
2018, in updating its laws to comply with the European
Union’s General Data Protection Regulation, Irish regu-
lations stipulated that waivers only be granted when “the
public interest in carrying out the health research signifi-
cantly outweighs the public interest in requiring the ex-
plicit consent of the data subject” [4].le is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License,
ution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give
the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if
d party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons
line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons
d by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain
. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
tion waiver (http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the
rwise stated in a credit line to the data.
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sole criterion for granting a waiver of consent. Other cri-
teria such as minimal risk are used together with public
interest to determine whether consent waiver should be
granted. Institutional review boards (IRBs)2 tasked with
approving or rejecting these waivers may, however, lack
formal guidance on how to interpret and implement the
public interest criterion. This is a concern for at least two
important reasons. Public interest is an amorphous and
mutable concept whose interpretation depends on the cir-
cumstances of the situation [5]. This flexibility notwith-
standing, its rigorous application as a criterion for consent
waiver necessitates an appreciation of the ethical import
and reason for the criterion. Unclear understandings could
cause confusion among researchers applying for the
waivers, or dissuade research that could only proceed with
a waiver. Moreover, they may lead to IRBs setting a low
ethical bar for the criterion which distorts its import and
undermines public trust in research, or an overly high bar
that hinders its reasonable application and in turn the effi-
ciency of health research regulation.
Second, where there is a lack of clear guidance, different
IRBs may apply the standard quite differently – especially if
waivers may be granted under expedited or exempt review,
with only a chairperson and/or a delegated member asses-
sing its appropriateness. Inconsistency in application of
waivers could lead to the same research project being
granted a waiver by one IRB, and rejected by another, intro-
ducing a degree of arbitrariness and unfairness into the re-
view process that should be avoided. While inconsistency is
a more general phenomenon in IRB review [6–9], some of
which may be attributed to reasonable variability in institu-
tional context, the addition of a public interest criterion is
problematic if it exacerbates those inconsistencies.
Thus, the risk of lack of clarity and consistency in the ap-
plication of the public interest criterion is problematic, and
this is particularly so given the gravity of overriding the indi-
vidual autonomy interest of citizens in knowing the dispos-
ition of their data and controlling access to and use of it via
consent. In view of the increasing number of jurisdictions
and institutions around the globe that now rely on the criter-
ion to justify human health research without consent, it is
timely and important to consider how it may be defensibly
deployed. Accordingly, this paper interrogates the notion of
the public interest in consent waivers for secondary research
on personal data or human tissue, and offers some sugges-
tions on how to apply it in practice with robust ethical legit-
imacy. To ensure that IRB’s judgments are more consistent,
objective, and justifiable, we propose an approach that is
guided by substantive and procedural justifications. Our2We use the term ‘IRB’ for convenience, recognising in some
jurisdictions equivalent bodies are referred to as research ethics
committees or similar.proposal should be of interest to researchers, ethicists and
IRBs in jurisdictions that implement or enforce a public
interest requirement on consent waivers. And while we focus
on consent waivers because of the particular challenges aris-
ing in that context, this analysis may also be of use for evalu-
ations of public interest in research in other contexts. For
example, our suggestions on procedural mechanisms for
assessing public interest may also be applicable to dispersal
of tissue stored in biobanks with the consent of patients and
under the expectation that such dispersal will advance public
interests. Elsewhere, one of us has argued that ‘public inter-
est’ is a preferable term to use among the various concepts
that are deployed in this debate3. ‘Public good’ is a term of
art in economics referring to non-rivalrous and non-
excludable resources, while ‘public benefit’ is too narrow by
excluding relevant considerations of justice. For the purpose
of this paper, we take the term ‘public interest’ to be syn-
onymous with ‘public good’ and ‘public benefit’, with the un-
derstanding that whatever term is used, it needs to be
juxtaposed against the other public interests that are in play
– notably, individual autonomy and privacy – in determining
whether consent waiver for secondary research serves and
benefits the public overall.Main text
Ethical relevance of the public interest criterion
The present discussion concerns consent waivers for
secondary research on personal data or human tissue –
that is, new research using data or tissue previously
gathered as part of clinical care, a distinct research pro-
ject, or in another context.
Any use of data or tissue would need compelling eth-
ical justification because personal data and human tissue
hold potentially sensitive information in which the
sources of the data/tissue, i.e. citizens, have an autonomy
and/or privacy interest. In contemporary health research
regulation, such justifications take one of roughly four
forms: authorisation, anonymisation, subject benefit and
public interest. (See Table 1).
It is commonplace to rely on the first two forms,
encompassing the so-called ‘consent or anonymise’ ap-
proach. In those cases, either participant authorisation is
sought, or data/tissue is anonymised to minimise risks to
the participant. In other instances, as with some emer-
gency research, the third form of subject benefit might be
used to justify the research. But sometimes consent is not
practicable, research requires the use of identifiable data,
and subjects would not directly benefit.
Furthermore, in many jurisdictions, such as the United
States and Singapore, health research regulation allows3Ballantyne, A, Schaefer, GO. Public interest in health data research:
laying out the conceptual groundwork. Unpublished manuscript
currently under review
Table 1 Four forms of justification for use of personal data/tissue
Subject
authorisation
Data subjects may consent to the use of data or tissue for a specified purpose (specific consent), or else agree to a wider range
of uses, subject to a trustworthy system of oversight (broad consent) [10, 11]. Either way, ethical justification for the use comes in
part from subjects being given the opportunity to exercise their autonomy in deciding whether the stated use is permissible [12,
13].
Anonymisation Regulatory regimes typically exclude anonymised tissue and data from consent requirements, in part on the grounds that if it is
sufficiently impracticable for someone to be able to re-identify someone in a dataset, the individual risk profile of using the data
will be exceedingly low [7, 14]. Interestingly, Singapore’s Human Biomedical Research Act is the first in the world to require con-
sent even for anonymised secondary tissue research, so this justification would not be available there.
Subject benefit In some cases it may not be possible to obtain consent, but the research would directly benefit the subject. In this case, the
benefit to the subject would have to be deemed as weightier than any privacy/autonomy interest the subject would have in
limiting the use of their data or tissue. Some forms of emergency research could fall in this category, though it is unlikely to be
applicable to secondary data/tissue studies under consideration here.
Public interest In other cases, data cannot be anonymised,a it would not be practicable to obtain consent, and the relevant use is not of direct
benefit to the individual. Still, a waiver could be justified on the grounds it contributes to the public interest. Here, that
contribution to the public interest would similarly have to be sufficient to override any privacy/autonomy interest individuals
may have in limiting the use of their data or tissue.
aEither because the data is only useful in identifiable format, or because anonymisation is not feasible. The latter category is becoming increasingly true of
datasets previously thought to be anonymised [15, 16]
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seek authorisation from the data/tissue subject is
bypassed when sufficiently good ethical reasons are
given to do so. Often, this is done in the name of the
public interest.
In those cases where the other three justifications are
not applicable, ‘public interest’ will be doing the moral
work of justifying the permissibility of the secondary re-
search. This requirement is similar to concerns in other
areas of governance: individual, private interests may be
overridden (subject to constraints) when the public
interest is sufficiently great [17]. As mentioned, research
regulatory regimes that include a public interest criter-
ion do not treat this threshold as sufficient in itself to
grant a waiver; other requirements such as minimal risk,
the necessity of using identifiable information, or im-
practicality in obtaining individual consent would apply.
However, where public interest is deployed it is viewed
as a necessary condition for granting a waiver, insofar as
good reason needs to be given why it is permissible to
override the privacy or autonomy interests of subjects in
maintaining control over their data or tissue.
Though public interest might exist on a continuum,
with some studies advancing it more than others, the
public interest criterion is binary – either a study meets
the requirement or it does not by meeting a certain
threshold along that continuum. Because of this, it be-
comes all the more important to understand where this
bright line might be drawn and how it can be justified.
Working definition of public interest
With this understanding of the justificatory role of ‘pub-
lic interest’ in consent waivers, we can now explore how
we might define the concept in practice in ways that give
full effect to its ethical basis, while also providing somemeans to deliver a degree of consistency in decision-
making.
One immediate worry about a public interest criterion
is that it may be redundant. It is generally accepted that
all research must demonstrate some degree of potential
social value of its results in order to be ethically justified
– as reflected, for example, in the most recent revisions
to the Council for International Organizations of Med-
ical Sciences (CIOMS) guidelines on human subjects re-
search [18]. Without a social value requirement on all
research, there would be little reason to impose risks on
subjects, undertake administrative burdens of oversight
and expend infrastructural resources required. But if
‘public interest’ were simply interpreted as a requirement
of all research akin to a synonym for social value, the
public interest criterion of consent waivers would be
trivial: a technical requirement that has no additional
practical or ethical import.
Yet, a trivial understanding would only make sense if
it played a trivial role. As it is used in health research
regulation, establishing the public interest produced by a
given study is quite critical to providing additional and
thorough ethical justification of a waiver of consent. For
example, with respect to the Singapore context, the Min-
istry of Health explained (during stakeholder communi-
cation) that the greater public good criterion in the 2015
law would not be routinely met by secondary data and
tissue research as currently practiced. That is, it must
meet a higher bar of public good (hence ‘greater public
good’) than the minimum expected of all research. This
is reflected in the CIOMS guidelines’ recommendations
concerning waivers of informed consent. In that context,
the guidelines clarify that the research must have “im-
portant social value” (p. 7) to meet the waiver criterion,
and yet the qualifier of ‘important’ is left unspecified
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strate at least the promise of some social value, we con-
tend that appeals to public interest or the public good
go further requiring more specific and arguably more ar-
duous standards to justify a waiver of consent.4
For a non-redundant, non-trivial understanding of
public interest in consent waivers in the context of bio-
medical research, we will propose the use of the follow-
ing definition:
Contribution to the public interest: Substantial ex-
pected advancement of the health-related interests of
members of a group whose interests are, or should
be, of particular concern to the society in question.
Several features of this definition are worth highlight-
ing. ‘Substantial’ will be crucial, distinguishing it from a
mere social value criterion. This may relate to the mag-
nitude of the benefit of the research, as well as the num-
ber of individuals potentially affected – though how to
adjudicate an appropriate threshold will be revisited in
our analysis below. ‘Expected’ acknowledges that, ex
ante, we cannot know whether a study will succeed, so
assessment of success would have to be tempered by
likelihood of success. The difficulty in assessing the mag-
nitude and probability of the good generated by research
motivates, in part, our analysis below. ‘Interests’ is
understood broadly, to include not just material or phys-
ical well-being but also considerations of justice, such as
equitable distribution of resources.
‘Groups of concern’ allows for research whose benefits
are targeted to a particular subpopulation, such as patients
affected by a particular disease. But, why not society (or
humanity) at large? The justificatory work of the public
interest discussed above does not require that all of soci-
ety benefit. Some research may indeed benefit all of soci-
ety and humanity, but others will only benefit a subset of
society, such as children, but nevertheless be of enough
importance to justify a waiver.5 Why not then specify
more simply that it should benefit some group or sub-
group? This would make the definition too inclusive –
e.g., research that only benefitted the profit margins of a
study sponsor. So the definition is made relative to groups
whose interests are of particular concerned to advance via
the research. An example might be rare disease groups
who, by definition, only represent a small percentage of
the population as a whole, but whose interests in proper
diagnosis and treatment can only be advanced by4For the purpose of this paper, we remain neutral on whether social
value is essentially the same concept as public interest, or a distinct
notion. For an argument that they are distinct, see footnote 3.
5That is not to say all research benefitting children would necessarily
be sufficiently contributing to the public interest to merit a waiver of
parental consent.supporting specific research into their condition. Further-
more, we must distinguish between direct and indirect
benefit. While it is the case that the only the rare disease
group will directly benefit from the research, it might also
be true that wider society indirectly benefits from the gen-
eralisable knowledge that is produced from the research
findings; for example, by creating a new research database
for yet further future research use.
Finally, ‘are or should be’ is added to include marginalised
groups whose interests are unjustly ignored by society at
large; such research may contribute to the public interest,
even if most members of the public wrongly fail to recog-
nise it. For example, in Europe there are widespread nega-
tive attitudes towards the Roma people [19], which has led
to substantial health disparities and a commensurate need
for greater attention from health researchers [20].Setting the bar
The question, then, naturally turns to how contribution
to the public interest should be determined. This matter
is somewhat related to another issue with which IRBs
must regularly grapple – whether a given study has an
acceptable risk-benefit ratio, taking into consideration
both individual subject and public benefit [21]. And as
with this last question, there is no strict formula or uni-
versal checklist that can be applied to determine the ap-
propriate bar.
This analysis encompasses two levels of inquiry: the sub-
stantive question of whether a given study is in fact in the
public interest; the procedural issue of how systems (local,
institutional or even national) should be designed to legit-
imately and reliably evaluate the public interest criterion.
Our procedural analysis will highlight the features needed
at the outset of setting up policies or practices around the
public interest criterion, as well as the further need for
long-term reflexivity on those policies or practices by rele-
vant bodies – making them constantly subject to revision,
with active procedures in place to facilitate this.Criteria-based approaches to the substantive question
An attractive approach would be for institutions and IRBs
to establish a set of evaluative criteria for meeting the public
interest requirement. Upon submission of a protocol for re-
view, researchers would answer a series of questions (e.g.,
related to impact, relevance to health priorities, likelihood
of success), which would then be assessed by the IRB. This
allows for careful attention to the nuances and particulars
of waiver applications to ensure that the proposed research
meets the putative public interest criterion.66This is roughly the approach put forward by the Ministry of Health in
Singapore; see its ‘Guidance on the Requirement of Appropriate
Consent for the Conduct of Human Biomedical Research and
Handling of Human Tissue’ [22].
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applicants to carve out the case for showing that their
research sufficiently contributes to the public interest.
But it introduces the possibility of inconsistency, incenti-
vises researchers (and perhaps also IRB members) to in-
flate importance, and presupposes the competency and
ability of institutions and IRBs to address the questions
at hand.
Inconsistency
This approach requires careful judgment at two stages: in-
stitutions (or regulators) establishing a set of criteria that
could justify a consent waiver on public interest grounds,
then IRBs evaluating whether a given protocol meets those
criteria. There are therefore two distinct opportunities for
inconsistency in judgment to be introduced, and substan-
tial scope for one IRB to come to a completely different
judgment from another for the very same protocol –
undermining claims to a system’s reliability and leaving it
open to concerns about untrustworthiness.
Inflated promise
From a researcher’s perspective, waivers are very attract-
ive – they open up datasets and tissue banks for use that
would otherwise be restricted due to autonomy or priv-
acy concerns. Conversely, rejecting a waiver could well
mean a study must entirely be cancelled, or at least
reworked, constituting substantial wastage of time and
resources. Faced with such possibilities, applicants there-
fore might be incentivised to give an inflated report of
various criteria – how important the research is, how
many could benefit, its likelihood of success, etc.
Difficulty in evaluation
Perhaps a sufficiently well-trained IRB could see past
such posturing, but that only raises a further question:
are IRBs (as well as institutions and researchers) really
equipped to make such judgment calls? Full evaluation
of the impact of a research project is in the first place
impossible until the results are produced. Projections
may be made, but few researchers are equipped to do a
full-scale rigorous impact assessment, complete with
verifiable probabilities of success and ranges of outcomes
on populations. This is especially the case for non-
interventional research like secondary data or tissue
studies. And even if projections were possible, it is not
clear that IRBs would be in a position to evaluate them,
or be disposed to challenge researchers’ assessments, es-
pecially the established ones. Left at this abstract level,
appeals to the public interest might end up serving the
same purpose as the need to show the prospect of
(some) social value. As such, this would merely intro-
duce redundancy into already burdensome bureaucratic
processes.Holistic evaluation of defined criteria
We contend that it is possible to build on a criteria-based
framework, while at least mitigating some of the flaws. As
noted, one of the main flaws of a criteria-based approach
is the difficulty of making a consistent, accurate and broad
assessment of a study’s contribution to the public interest.
But criteria could be selected based on clarity, ease of for-
mulation by researchers or IRBs, and general justifiability
in terms of contributing to the public interest. Establishing
a standardised array of information relating to the public
interest criterion for the IRB to evaluate would limit diver-
gence between judgments, at least at the IRB level, by en-
suring all waiver applications are subjected to the same
evidentiary basis of evaluation. Standardising evidence
would also limit the ability of researchers to over-inflate
impact by only providing information favourable to their
case, and omitting information unfavourable. Finally, by
setting well-defined criteria that all studies would have to
meet, some burden on individual IRBs to determine what
substantially contributes to the public interest and what
does not would be limited.
Some examples of candidate criteria, along with a justifi-
cation concerning contribution to the public interest, in-
clude addressing a health priority; scientific robustness;
open access; non-patentability/copyright; and translatabil-
ity. (See Table 2) We will not offer a thoroughgoing de-
fence of why each of these criteria should be included in a
holistic evaluation of the public interest criterion, as our
intention here is not to specify the precise contents of
such an evaluation. Instead, we offer these examples as il-
lustrations of the sort of criteria we have in mind that
could, when properly refined and justified, fill out a sys-
tematic evaluation of the public interest. Such examples
could – alone or in combination – be set as threshold pa-
rameters for determining public interest in a given re-
search context. For example, a research regulator wishing
to promote research in a particular field might issue guid-
ance that public interest will be more likely determined by
robust scientific protocols that commit to open access,
have a clear pathway for findings back to the clinic, and a
defensible policy on intellectual property rights. We will
return to some of these more procedural questions below.
This approach helps mitigate some of the challenges
of open-ended criteria, by offering researchers and IRBs
a structured set of definable components by which to
evaluate a study. However, these criteria cannot provide
on their own a formulaic or definitive answer to which
studies meet a public interest criterion and which do
not. Due to the nature of the concept of public interest,
such a formula is unfortunately not possible, nor indeed
is it desirable. Rather, this model provides non-
exhaustive categories which tend towards contribution
to the public interest that is supportive of a waiver, while
at the same time allows decision-makers to expand and/
Table 2 Candidate criteria for assessing the public interest in allowing consent waiver
Addressing a health priority Many countries and institutions have identified top priorities in health or other areas. There are also the Sustainable
Development Goals that have been set by the UN as key priorities for good health and well-being [23]. IRBs could
rely on such a list, using it as a proxy for the areas of greatest public concern and favour waiver applications that
address such areas – though being on this list would not be decisive in being granted a waiver. Rather, it would
provide a good ethical reason in favour of waiver, setting the balance more towards that option.
Scientific robustness All research should be scientifically valid in order to be approved, but studies may vary in terms of their robustness
– that is, the extent to which the study as designed will be able to answer its research question(s) with a high
degree of confidence. More robust studies will be more likely to contribute to generalisable knowledge, and
thereby the public interest. Examples of factors contributing to robustness would be sample size, appropriateness
of statistical methodology, and quality of the data. This would require independently verifiable evidence of such
robustness to be submitted to any ethics decision-making body.
Open access of publications
and datasets
As the primary output of biomedical research is knowledge that is meant to benefit future practice, allowing open
access can help ensure such findings are indeed disseminated widely and have as much impact as possible [24].
This will require some extra expense on the part of research budgets, but should have the general social benefit of
contributing to knowledge sharing. The recent move by several European funders to require publication of articles
in open access journals that do not charge subscriptions might go some way towards ameliorating this difficulty,
by putting pressure on an outdated model of high-cost academic publishing [25]. Such policies might also extend
to deposits of raw data, after sufficient embargo periods to allow the primary researchers to publish from their own
results.
Non-patentability/copyright of
findings
While patents and copyright may serve the public interest by incentivising valuable research, they can also inhibit
it by raising the cost of interventions and keeping those valuable insights out of the public domain. A research
project committed to ensuring findings are kept on a creative commons or similar license would have a stronger
case for contribution to the public interest than one that does not. Due to funding restrictions, not all valuable
research may be able to meet this criterion, but the increased use of this criterion by ethics bodies might have the
effect of putting pressure on funders to at least loosen or liberalise such license.
Translatability Research whose results have direct, measurable relevance to practice or policy would in virtue of this have a
greater claim to contribution to the public interest. For research that is more preliminary or concerned with proof
of principle, evidence may instead be put forward of ‘clinical promise’: an explanation of how the research, in
combination with other studies and evidence bases, could eventually lead to translational impact. This draws on
the concept ‘clinical promise’ that has recently been urged by Kimmelman and Federico as a criterion for approval
of first-in-human clinical trials [26].
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ing the criteria-based approach but still relative to this
starting point of commonly-accepted elements that are
indicative of advancing the health interest of the public
or society.
At the end of the day, however, IRBs must still make a
judgment, based on researchers’ responses to a series of
queries, about whether a study sufficiently contributes to
the public interest to merit a consent waiver. As such,
further efforts are needed to ensure that the IRB’s judg-
ments are consistent and justifiable. These matters are,
in themselves, a matter of the public interest, helping to
ensure that any model is knowable, fair, transparent and
kept under regular review to respond to lessons learned
from its operation in dealing with live health research
applications.
Procedural considerations in setting policy and practice
To meet this challenge of promoting consistency and jus-
tifiability, we propose adverting to procedural features of
ethics review. Procedures do not themselves define which
studies would fulfil the public interest criteria, but instead
focus on helping ensure that the relevant decision-making
mechanisms are fair, consistent and relevantly informed.
Many of the procedures we outline below will not be
unique to the issue of consent waivers, but we will showhow applying them is particularly relevant and fruitful in
this context. These procedures come in at two levels: set-
ting a policy around the public interest criterion, and indi-
vidual IRBs’ application of that policy.
Setting national or institutional policy
We previously highlighted several substantive approaches
that may be taken to determining which studies meet a
public interest criterion. At the very least, research institu-
tions should set their own internal policies clarifying for
IRBs and researchers not only how the determination of
the public interest is to be undertaken, but also how in
practice it should be evaluated.
Ideally, the overarching aim should be towards
consistency in judgments concerning what studies meet
the public interest criterion between IRBs and institutions
within a given jurisdiction and over time. This may be
achieved by a national initiative, which has the advantage
of ensuring clarity of the core indicators and consistency
with regulatory intent.
An alternative, if national policies are not forthcoming
or if its definitions are still under-specified, is for institu-
tions to promulgate their own practices and aim to har-
monise them to a reasonable extent. Harmonisation may
be difficult in many contexts due to difficulties in coordin-
ation between divergent institutions, but could be well
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plication for a waiver would succeed at one institution but
fail at another. This would require mechanisms of com-
munications and feedback between institutions, and we
address this further below.
These policies would need to meet standard require-
ments of good governance. In particular, they should be
transparent, reasonable and accountable [27]. Transpar-
ency of the policy (and its justifications) is crucial for ad-
equate implementation, as well as allowing the policies
to be open to legitimate scrutiny from concerned parties.
Reasonableness is understood as being justifiable to
stakeholders regardless of their personal parochial views;
any accepted notion of the public interest must in this
way appeal to values that are, in turn, of appeal to the
general population, and not just a subset. And account-
ability is necessary to make clear whose job it is to estab-
lish and evaluate the public interest of research for any
given application. IRBs will presumably have a central
role, but researchers must assume responsibility for their
study and make all reasonable efforts to identify and jus-
tify the public interests and goods they seek to advance.
This could be done with the support of other bodies like
funding agencies, sponsors, institutions and regulators.
Perhaps most importantly, the process of delineating
the public interest criterion should be done in consult-
ation with the public (or ‘publics’) at large. Suggestions
are offered in this paper and elsewhere3 on how this can
be done, but a procedurally robust approach would not
simply adopt the arguments from academic literature.
Because public interest, by definition, appeals to the
sensibilities and the needs of the public – and in recog-
nition that these matters will change over time with so-
cial mores and values and exposure to the benefits of
research efficiency - the final conceptualisation of public
interest adopted by institutions must incorporate public
attitudes and values, or at least be able to give a robust
account relative to the same. The pragmatics of such
public engagement are outside the scope of this paper,
but some models can be highlighted: citizens’ juries;
community consultation and community representation.
A citizens’ jury comprised of a random selection of in-
dividuals that are demographically representative of the
general public could deliberate on the question of what
research counts as being in the public interest [28]. Ju-
rors would receive ‘testimony’ and evidence, but it would
ultimately be up to them to decide (as a jury would)
what answer should be accepted. Such approaches are
especially useful in cases like the present, where the
complexities of the question make a traditional survey
or focus group inadequate to ensure deliberation is ad-
equately informed. However, there are limitations of citi-
zens’ juries that should be noted, including bias and
advocacy hijacking [29].More broadly, potential policy options should be subject
to a process of consultation (and, ideally, co-production)
with key community and stakeholder groups [30]. Re-
searchers themselves will be an important group to con-
sult, especially those who will be seeking the consent
waivers. Defining the public interest in the abstract may
not be possible in such a forum, so a case-based approach
may be preferred: propose example cases, and interrogate
the extent to which they are deemed sufficiently in the
public interest to merit a consent waiver. Analysis could
then be performed to determine patterns behind which
cases were accepted and which were not. And those initial,
agreed-upon paradigmatic cases could be used as a re-
source and reference guide by IRBs as well as researchers
for future applications. The precise shape of the consult-
ation will depend on the social context and practical re-
sources available.
Separate from community consultation, it would be
advisable for the policymaking body that determines
how public interest should be defined to contain mem-
bers of the lay public – individuals not themselves in-
volved in research or research oversight. This is to
ensure that the final results are indeed reasonable for in-
cluding a spectrum of views, in the sense that they are
based not just on the parochial values of an institution
or other body setting policy, but incorporate or take into
account values held by the community at large as well.
IRB review
Procedures adopted by IRBs would need several safe-
guards to promote consistency and reasonableness. The
following proposals might be adopted at a systems level,
across a jurisdiction, if a more top-down approach is
taken; or they could be taken up by individual IRBs and/
or their institutions if such systems-level coordination is
not present.
At least early on in implementation, such waiver appli-
cations require subjective judgment and, as such, should
be reviewed by a full board. This may be more adminis-
tratively onerous, but it is essential because of the nature
of expedited or exempt reviews: they both involve review
by perhaps one or two IRB members. This increases the
risk of arbitrary interpretations or individual members’
idiosyncratic values affecting judgment and leading to
inconsistency of judgment between decision-making
bodies. A full board would still have to make a judg-
ment, but by coming to a consensus such arbitrariness
can at least be mitigated. Over time, as consistent,
precedent-based understanding of what qualifies as in
the public interest would be established (see the next
subsection), the risk of arbitrariness will go down; at that
point, it may be possible to relax this requirement.
Relatedly, IRBs should ensure that (as with the policy-
making body), the perspectives of the lay public are
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Again, this is to ensure that institution-specific values
and perspectives do not dominate the judgment being
made. Lay membership is generally seen as a require-
ment for IRBs [31], but it is especially important (and
representation therefore may need to be greater) for sub-
jective evaluations of the public interest. While scientific
members of an IRB provide expertise essential to under-
standing a study’s risks and benefits, scientific robust-
ness, and other important features of review, such
expertise will be much less central to assessing whether
the study substantially advances the public interest. In-
stead, having a broader array of perspectives on the
value of a given study will help avoid ethical blind spots
(e.g., overlooking or underemphasising the interests of
some subgroups) and enrich the evaluation of the public
interest criterion.
The reasons for granting a waiver, or especially for
rejecting it, should also be made transparent to the re-
searcher. The researcher may (reasonably) wish to ap-
peal an unjustified rejection, or else alter the study to
improve its prospect for contributing to the public inter-
est and re-submit accordingly. It will also help promote
trust in the approval system, warding it against the
charge that its decisions are arbitrary, as well as prompt
reasoned critique in the system that could be used by
IRBs and institutions to improve their approach. More-
over, aggregate reasons for granting and rejecting
waivers should, in due course, be made public both in
the interests of transparency as well as to increase learn-
ing from the system. This should not include researcher-
level information, merely classes of research and types
applications and brief accounts of reasons for the deci-
sions in interpreting the public interest criterion.
These additional procedures are especially important if
criteria are used in evaluating public interest. The sub-
jective nature of such judgments leads to the challenges
discussed earlier on, but these procedures may go some
ways towards addressing those challenges.
Periodic review
Neither policies nor IRB practice should not be consid-
ered static, but should be subject to periodic review to
ensure that practices are indeed meeting expectations. In
particular, has the approach reached an adequate and
acceptable balance between pragmatic operability and
ethical justifiability? This review need not be in the form
of top-down governmental audit, but could be internal
or inter-institutional.
This systems review can address inconsistency of judg-
ments between and even within IRBs, one of the more
glaring difficulties in evaluating public interest. Review
should compile summaries of a series of cases that have
been adjudicated, with two purposes in mind.First, within a given institution, precedent can be
established. Just as was suggested above for hypothetical
cases at the policy-setting stage. Institutions can thereby
derive patterns and norms from the judgments that have
been made. These judgments can first and foremost be
evaluated to ensure they do, in fact, meet a reasonable
standard of ethical justifiability. They can, moreover,
provide a useful guide to future IRBs as well as re-
searchers to facilitate understanding of which sorts of
studies pass the bar, and which do not. This can ensure
that IRB member turnover and review by different mem-
bers does not substantially affect the outcome. Such a
model was adopted by the Confidentiality Advisory
Group in England and Wales for use of medical records
[32], and this could be replicated elsewhere.
Second, both between and within institutions, cases
can be used to determine whether or not IRBs are con-
sistent with one another in their evaluative approach. Is
one IRB (or IRB member) evaluating at a much higher
bar than another? If so, this is a problem that would
need to be addressed, ideally by the inconsistent parties
meeting, discussing their differences, and working to-
wards a mutual understanding to reduce such inconsist-
encies in the future. This might also lead to system-wide
(re)training for IRBs, all learning from the experiences of
the few. For this purpose, something like the UK’s
Shared Ethical Debate (ShED) tool could be used. Under
the ShED model, identical protocols are sent out to mul-
tiple ethics committees, whose evaluations are then
compared for consistency. Current ShED results show
that even in more well-defined areas of ethics review,
there is substantial inconsistency. The inconsistency has,
however, been reduced over time, owing in part to feed-
back given to ethics committees regarding the extent to
which their responses align with other committees’ [33].
This leverages committees’ intrinsic motivation to seek
inter-committee consistency by highlighting to outlier
committees how their judgments may be more aberrant
than they realize. A reduction in inconsistency is espe-
cially important for evaluating public interest claims, as
interpretation is likely to foster substantial disagreement.
Such review processes would be much more straight-
forward in systems with national coordination of IRBs.
In jurisdictions lacking a national system, it will instead
be up to the IRBs to take it upon themselves to come to-
gether for such a review exercise. While this may be
time-consuming, it will help promote the legitimacy and
reliability of decision-making within the jurisdiction. In-
deed, such review need not be limited to evaluating the
public interest criterion – both the ShED and Confiden-
tiality Advisory Group examples above are wider in
scope.
Whatever the institutional or national set-up, however,
the key point here is that some mechanism of mutual
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making bodies when it comes to interpretations and ap-
plications of the public interest criterion. In the very
least, adopting this approach could improve the
consistency in evaluating the public interest criterion
both between members of a given IRB, and between dif-
ferent IRBs. More broadly, it could also help improve
confidence towards and trust in the ethics review
process amongst researchers as well as the general pub-
lic. By establishing not only a set of clear, reasoned cri-
teria for meeting the public interest requirement, but
also a system of evaluation and refinement of the rele-
vant standards, institutions and IRBs can demonstrate
responsiveness and flexibility in governance of human
subjects research.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have striven to offer an understanding
of the public interest criterion for the purpose of con-
sent waivers, and offered some suggestions as to the best
way to implement such a requirement. We have pro-
posed an approach that analyses how (i) public interest
can best be understood in the present context as a justi-
fication for research using data/samples; (ii) well-defined
criteria may be useful for IRBs/researchers to determine
whether a given study meets the criterion; (iii) existing
good governance frameworks to the second-order con-
siderations for procedural measures concerning policies/
institutional practices related to public interest can be
applied, and (iv) application of the public interest criter-
ion should be reflexive, using measures such as periodic
intra-IRB review. This approach balances the need to be
sensitive to different studies’ nuances with the need to
be efficient, transparent, accountable and consistent
across domains. And we have also suggested the proced-
ural features that should be met when determining what
counts as contribution to the public interest. This is not
meant to be a decisive determination, as actual practice
will require adaptation to institutional context, re-
sources, and capacity. But we hope it can serve as a use-
ful guide to institutions and IRBs struggling with the
difficult question of how to evaluate which studies may
indeed be contributing to the public interest.
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